The National Transportation Safety Board has released a preliminary report with previously unknown facts about the crash between a Black Hawk Army helicopter and CRJ passenger jet that killed 67 people on January 29, 2025. In this episode, listen to testimony about that report along with testimony from FAA and military officials about actions they have taken since the crash. Also included in this episode is a brief summary of what we know so far about the disturbing air traffic control outages that have occurred at airports in Newark and Denver.
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Background Sources
Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes
CD310: Red Flags at Air Traffic Control
CD293: NTSB Transportation Safety Warnings
CD152: Air Traffic Control Privatization
Newark Outages
“FAA Statements on Newark Liberty International Airport.” May 13, 2025. FAA.
“Newark Airport Had 3 Controllers on Duty When the Goal Is 14.” Niraj Chokshi et al. May 12, 2025. The New York Times.
“Equipment issue again disrupts air traffic at Newark Liberty airport in New Jersey, FAA says.” Bill Hutchinson et al. May 12, 2025. 6abc.
“Controllers briefly lost contact with Newark planes before wider flight disruptions.” Mike Catalini et al. May 6, 2025. AP News.
“Radar Screens At Newark Airport Went Black Again Overnight.” May 9, 2025. iHeartRadio.
Denver Outage
“FAA confirms brief loss of communication between air traffic controllers and some planes Monday.” Tony Gorman. May 15, 2025. CPR News.
“Denver air traffic control went dark for 90 seconds, FAA confirms.” Katie Langford. May 15, 2025. The Denver Post.
“Outage leaves up to 20 pilots headed to Denver airport unable to contact air traffic control on Monday.” Tony Kovaleski. May 14, 2025. Denver7.
NTSB Preliminary Report on DCA Crash
“Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report, DCA25MA108.” David Banning. National Transportation Safety Board.
ADS-B
What is ADS-B?
“ADS-B FAQ.” FAA.
“ADS-B Out Explained.” Textron Aviation.
“ADS-B Out and ADS-B In Explained.” Spire.
“Question: What are Mode C/S transponders and how do they work compared to ADS-B?” Updated March 8, 2024. SafeSky.
Requirements and Exceptions
“Letter from Senator Maria Cantwell to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth.” March 7, 2025. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
“Letter from the Joint Staff of the Department of Defense to Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton.” June 8, 2023. norton.house.gov
“14 CFR 91.225: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment and use.”
“Revision to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) Out Equipment and Use Requirements.” July 18, 2019. U.S. Federal Register v. 84 no. 138.
May Near Miss at DCA
“DC military-air traffic control hotline hasn’t worked for over 3 years.” Josh Funk. May 14, 2025. Defense News.
Laws
H.R.3935 – FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024
- H.Amdt. 283 (Owens) to H.R. 3935: To protect all existing flights at Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA)
- SEC. 206. FUTURE OF NEXTGEN. Not later than December 31, 2025, the Administrator shall operationalize all of the key programs under the NextGen program as described in the deployment plan of the FAA.
- SEC. 619. NEXTGEN PROGRAMS. $18 billion to evaluate and expedite the implementation of NextGen programs and capabilities.
Audio Sources
FAA Reauthorization One Year Later: Aviation Safety, Air Traffic, and Next Generation Technology
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation
May 14, 2025
Witnesses:
- Jodi Baker, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, FAA
- Franklin McIntosh, Deputy Chief Operating Officer, Air Traffic Organization, FAA
- Wayne Heibeck, Deputy Associate Administrator for Airports, FAA
Clips
48:15 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
On April 25, for the first time since the January 28 mid air collision, the Army resumed flying in the National Capital Region. Less than a week later, Air Traffic Control had to command two commercial aircraft on final approach to abort their landing at DCA due to an army Black Hawk on an apparent training mission at the Pentagon having wandered far too close to the commercial aircraft flight path. Shortly thereafter, and just 10 days after having resumed limited flight in the National Capital Region, the Army Aviation Brigade suspended operations in the DC area. Mr. McIntosh, I’ve been told that prior to the Army Aviation Brigade’s decision to suspend operations on May 5, the FAA was preparing to suspend the letter of agreement between the Army and the FAA that gives the Army the ability to operate in the DC airspace without having to first ask for FAA clearance for each flight. Was the FAA prepared to suspend the letter of agreement? And if so, what was concerning enough to justify such a decision?
Franklin McIntosh:
Thank you for the question, Senator Cruz. Like yourself, we were extremely troubled by the incident that occurred, especially in light of DCA and the events that led up to the accident. To be quite honest with you, we were ready to deploy any option available that we could use or that we felt was necessary to bring safety measures and better behaviors from the DoD. In this instance, to answer your question, we were ready to do any option available to include what you just spoke to, which was removing the ability to fly.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
So just just to be clear, that does that mean the FAA did actually draft an order suspending the Army’s ability to fly in the DC area? I’m
Franklin McIntosh:
I’m not 100% aware if we drafted an order, sir, but we did have discussions if that was an option that we wanted to pursue. I do know that the DoD came back and suspended operations on their own based on that event, so we’re still working with DoD to improve that process.
50:40 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Is it true that the hotline, the direct line between the Pentagon Air Traffic Control and the DCA tower, has been inoperable since March of 2022?
Franklin McIntosh:
Yes, sir, that is correct.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Who maintains that hotline?
Franklin McIntosh:
I believe the DoD maintains that hotline. But I think the next question would be, Why were we not aware of it and insist upon it being fixed?
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
I didn’t have that written down, but it’s a good one.
Franklin McIntosh:
So, we take safety responsibilities extremely seriously in the FAA, and those were the questions we were asking, and we were not aware, but we became aware after that event, and now that we became aware of that event, we’re insisting upon that line to be fixed before we resume any operations out of the Pentagon.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Do you have a timeline for when that line will be operational?
Franklin McIntosh:
To be honest with you, Senator, I would expect the DoD to expedite that timeline so they can begin their operations.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
While army flights were ongoing, if the hotline was not operational, how did controllers communicate?
Franklin McIntosh:
That’s a great question, Senator, we still have landline abilities. We can make phone calls from the helipad to the operation where the supervisor, or even the controller in charge, can answer so we’re aware of the activity, and if there was a departure clearance needed, we’d be able to relay it via that mechanism.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Is it also true that the air traffic control positions for local traffic and helicopters were combined early, just as they were on the day of the mid air collision?
Franklin McIntosh:
Yes, sir, it was.
52:45 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Newark International Airport has been beset by delays after the radar system malfunctioned, leaving controllers unable to see or communicate with aircraft in their sector for approximately 90 seconds. What broke down and how did the system become this deteriorated in the first place?
Franklin McIntosh:
Thank you, Senator. To answer your question, we were obviously very concerned about the disruptions that occurred in Newark airspace as well, for the 90 seconds that it occurred. When we did our investigation, what we found out was our telecommunication provider that provides network lines into that area. There’s two lines, Senator, that provide data and transmission feeds. The primary line that came in failed. We have a secondary, redundant line that provides the radar transmissions and our voice capabilities. And that redundant line is supposed to assume that load, and it’s supposed to be instantaneous, where, if we were to have a fiber cut of a line, or a copper cut of line, something along those regards, then that redundant line is supposed to kick in. When we lost that first line, the second line did not kick in like it was designed to do. That’s what caused the disruption. The disruption was for 90 seconds. I’m an air traffic controller by trade, so I’m just going to talk like an air traffic controller, if that’s okay. Air traffic controllers provide positive separation between aircraft. That is what we do. And what I mean by that is we never point aircraft head on at the same altitude. We ensure we have appropriate levels of separation in the event that we have something like a nordo aircraft that has a stuck mic that could jam up the frequencies, or if we have some something like that, so we didn’t have a loss of separation based on some of our procedures that we have installed and the techniques that we use as controllers. I do want to highlight that. But 90 seconds is a long time for an air traffic controller, so although we have contingencies in place that we use to make sure that we keep aircraft safe, it is a long disruption for a radar screen to go blank, we’re not to be able to talk to aircraft. So that was something that we wanted to take a look at, and we have put in corrective measures since that happened to ensure that those redundancies are better for that airspace. We have this system across the United States, feeding radar data like this, where we have a line and a redundant line, and we haven’t had a failure like this, to this degree, in my memory. So we had to put together, along with the local vendor that was responsible for the telecommunications to provide a more resistant, or a better contingency, to ensure that, if ever happen again, that we feel good about those processes, we were able to implement a new contingency, and we are working with a telco provider, along with Secretary Duffy’s leadership, to actually bring in a third line of redundancy into that area to prevent this from happening again.
59:45 Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL):
Mr. Macintosh FAA is responsible for establishing those routes. Has FAA established a helicopter route that circles the Pentagon? Is that an established landing procedure? Circle to land. Is that a procedure around the Pentagon?
Franklin McIntosh:
Yes, ma’am, to answer your question, and you’re a pilot, I’m a controller. So I’ll be very frank with you. We have asked that question via our letter of agreement. And I think the larger question here, to be honest with you, and to your point, what we need to make sure that we assure, is that everybody knows their responsibilities, which is as a pilot or even the heliport tower, you had an aircraft that you did not give a landing clearance to, where that aircraft aborted the landing. Whatever occurred, that aircraft went back and entered Class B airspace. That aircraft is not supposed to enter Class B airspace without permission of air traffic control. That did not occur. My question, and I think the larger question is, why did that not occur? Without compliance to our procedures and our policies, this is where safety drift starts to happen, and that’s where my line of question is, even if absent a published go around procedure, if we want to call it, that pilots and controllers have shared responsibilities, do not enter Class B airspace without authorization from air traffic control, and that is a question that we are asking.
1:02:30 Franklin McIntosh:
While we had what’s, in my opinion as a pilot, deviation, I do want to commend the controllers at the time for their actions, for ensuring they gave a time to go around to those two aircraft.
NTSB Preliminary Report: The DCA Midair Collision
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation
March 27, 2025
Witnesses:
- Chris Rocheleau, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
- Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
- Matthew W. Braman, Director of Army Aviation, U.S. Army
Clips
45:30 Jennifer Homendy:
On March 11, we released our preliminary report, which contains only factual information that we’ve gathered in the first few weeks, all of which can change throughout the course of the investigation. It doesn’t include analysis or findings, nor does it determine probable cause. Those will be in our final report.
45:55 Jennifer Homendy: But we don’t wait for a final report to take action if we uncover critical safety issues that require immediate attention, which is why, in conjunction with the release of our preliminary report, we also issued two urgent safety recommendations to the FAA. In both reports, we cited FAA surveillance data that showed between october 2021 and december 2024 there were over 15,000 close proximity events between commercial aircraft and helicopters at DCA. In reviewing that and other data, including airport operations and established helicopter routes, we determined that the separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route four and aircraft using runways one, five and three, three are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety. As a result, we recommended that the FAA prohibit operations on helicopter route four between Haynes point and Wilson Bridge when those runways are being used for departures and arrivals. We also recommended that the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Haynes point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route four is closed.
47:55 Jennifer Homendy:
Investigations take time. We have a lot of work to do in this investigation, from interviews, to analyses of large volumes of documents and data to review, to air carrier operations that we have to review, helicopter operations, air traffic control, human performance, helicopter air worthiness, flight recorders and more. In total, we have about 40 NTSB experts leading this investigation, in collaboration with the parties and others, and we’re aiming to complete this investigation within one year.
50:40 Chris Rocheleau:
The recommendations align with the actions the FAA took under Secretary Duffy’s leadership immediately following the accident to restrict helicopter operations around DCA, eliminating mixed helicopter and fixed wing traffic, and carefully developing alternative routes. Following the NTSB recommendations, the FAA took action to make these restrictions permanent. When essential helicopter operations, such as life saving medical, active law enforcement, active air defense, or presidential transport must operate in the flight restricted airspace, fixed wing aircraft are not allowed in that airspace.
51:20 Chris Rocheleau:
We’re also continuing to analyze other airports that have both established helicopter routes and nearby airplane traffic. The FAA is also carefully reviewing offshore helicopter operations. As part of this analysis, we’re using machine learning and language modeling to scan incident reports and explore multiple data sources to find themes and areas of concern. We will take immediate action if needed to mitigate any identified safety risks.
52:00 Chris Rocheleau: All aircraft operating in DCA Class B airspace will be required to broadcast their position and identification using ADS-B Out with very limited exceptions.
52:15 Chris Rocheleau:
Air Traffic Control staffing is a top priority as air traffic controllers play a critical role in keeping the American people safe. Right now, we have over 10,750 controllers on the job, with over 3000 in training. We intend to hire another 2000 controllers this year, we have streamlined the hiring process and incentivized hiring with a 30% increase in the salary of those who qualify to attend the FAS Academy, and we’re already seeing positive results from these improvements during the hiring surge that closed last week, we received over 10,000 applications, and more than 8000 of those were referred to testing.
55:20 Matthew Braman:
For context, PAT25’s unit, the 12th Aviation Battalion, falls under the Army Aviation Brigade, or what we refer to as the TAB, and that unit has the mission to provide continuous, responsive aviation support to senior military and government leaders, to enable continuity of government operations and defense support to civil authorities.
56:05 Matthew Braman:
PAT25 was operating out of Davidson Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir. The crew of three were fully qualified to fly in the local area. The Pilot in Command, CWO2 Andrew Eaves, was an instructor pilot. The co-pilot, Captain Rebecca Lobach, was a qualified Pilot inCommand as well. The Crew Chief, Staff Sergeant Ryan O’Hara, was a standardization flight instructor. The night of 29 January, PAT25 was conducting an annual proficiency and readiness test, or APART. As part of that flight was approved, operated contingency locations associated with their direct admission. This has led to questions as to whether PAT25 was transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Out or ADS-B Out. The specific status of both its operation and functionality is something that is under the investigation of the NTSB. The crew, however, was approved to operate with that capability off in accordance with Army policy.
57:05 Matthew Braman:
The aircraft transponder, however, was active with Mode 3 Alpha Charlie and Mode S when within the Class B airspace and was emitting all the required information to allow air traffic services and traffic collision avoidance systems to detect and track the aircraft. Army policy does not permit transponder-off operations in the national airspace. They do not permit transponder-off operations.
58:15 Matthew Braman:
But where prudent, the Army is not waiting to take action. Immediately after the accident, the 12th Aviation Battalion paused all operations. They’ve only recently resumed flights and only outside the seven nautical mile radius of DCA, with the exception of flights directly supporting the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And that remains true today.
58:40 Matthew Braman:
The army is actively participating, along with other military services and agencies, with an FAA-led working group to redesign the Route 4 helicopter corridor, as recommended by the NTSB in its preliminary report.
58:55 Matthew Braman:
We’ve also issued interim guidance to elevate the approval authority to operate ADSB off.
59:40 Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
First of all, I am interested in learning about the occurrences that have been described. I described in my opening statement, about near misses and occurrences, TCAS advisories that occurred on numerous occasions over a long period of time, and what I hope you, and I will ask the administrator of the FAA these questions, but I would like to know, What did people know? When did they know it? And why didn’t someone do something about it? In asking you about this topic, is the information that is collected by the FAA, that’s where this these statistics that we’ve each mentioned, that’s where they come from. Is that true?
Jennifer Homendy:
There were different sources of information, some which were the FAA, some of which are voluntary safety reporting programs.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
And those voluntary safety reporting programs, it’s voluntary reporting to the FAA?
Jennifer Homendy:
Yes.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
So the information that has been described here about those events over a long period of time is utilized by you, but housed at the FAA,
Jennifer Homendy:
I believe through a contractor, but yes.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
Do you know at this point whether that information was reviewed in a regular manner? Have you investigated why information that seems so important didn’t result in changes in policy, rules or regulations?
Jennifer Homendy:
I don’t know why. What I will say is this came from a data request from the NTSB. We made that with the FAA and received information from the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), from ATSAP, which is air traffic control, from mandatory occurrence reports. And we also received information from FAA surveillance data from radar. But this was a request from us, and that resulted in our evaluation of that data and our urgent safety recommendations. I don’t know if the FAA pulled that data themselves at any point, and I’d have to defer to the acting administrator on that.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
That information was so valuable, so important, so critical, that that’s the reason you asked for the immediate changes in safety regulations, true?
Jennifer Homendy:
Yes. And you know, there does seem to be an issue with identifying emerging trends and looking at, there’s a lot of data going to FAA, and taking that data and looking at trends and not specific issues, I think, is something not only the IG has raised, but others have raised, even the Acting Administrator has raised, about having to do a better job with analyzing those trends. But it’s key, because if we can get it after an accident occurs, what’s key is getting it before and preventing it.
1:04:25 Chris Rocheleau:
There’s an ongoing review all the time of the data that is available. As the Chair mentioned, there’s millions of pieces of data that come in, and I would tell you that we have verified every single near mid air collision was investigated, but there are certainly those instances where the information itself was not identified, and that’s why we’ve put artificial intelligence and machine learning in place now to ensure that we’re able to go through millions and millions, tens of millions of pieces of data to identify those trends and act quickly to mitigate those risks.
1:05:55 Chris Rocheleau:
We have 10 locations around the United States, including Anchorage, Alaska, that we’re looking through right now, what we are referring to as hot spots, to look at similar trends, similar activities as it relates to fixed wing and helicopter operations.
1:10:00 Matthew Braman:
So in the occurrence of things like ADS-B Out operations, that authority resides with a medium risk authority. So a battalion commander must approve that mission in particular. And in this case, the policy allowed that to be delegated down to a company commander, and they must approve that it meets the standards of the of the policy completely. We have now elevated that risk to high risk. That requires an 06 Commander to approve any mission that has ADS-B off.
1:14:00 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
How frequently does the army turn off ADS-B Out transmission?
Matthew Braman:
Chairman Cruz, as I stated in the discussion about how we approve the missions, a mission would have to fall into the category as defined in the federal regulation and army policy. It must have national security implications and be sensitive in nature to be able to do that.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
General, you’re not answering my question. My question is, how frequently is ads be out turned off? I wasn’t asking what the standard is. I was asking the frequency.
Matthew Braman:
I can take the number for record, Senator, but I can tell you the types of missions, and the majority of the missions they fly are missions associated with that national security mission.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Is it accurate that ADS-B Out is turned off for 100% of missions flown by the Army Air Brigade at Fort Belvoir?
Matthew Braman:
Senator, I think you’re referring to the June 8 letter from the Joint Staff to Representative Norton. In the context of missions, meaning the operations that the 12th Aviation supports in their mission requirements, I would say that’s an accurate statement. I would not say that’s an accurate statement of 100% of the flights being flown by that organization.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
Okay, so I want to understand what you mean by missions. Does missions capture training flights?
Matthew Braman:
Only training flights that would have been operating in a location that’s sensitive as part of their continuity of government operations.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
That would be all of them around DCA. Is that correct?
Matthew Braman:
Only specific sites that are part of that continuity of government operation.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
In your one pager, you said 75% of the flights are mission rehearsal readiness flights. Are those operated with ADS-B Out?
Matthew Braman:
They are, Senator, yes.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
So right now, today, the Army is flying helicopters in and around DCA airport with ADS-B Out turned off, is that correct?
Matthew Braman:
When conducting their NORTHCOM directed mission, that is correct.
1:17:15 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
The Army has a memo August 9, 2024 entitled ADS-B Out off operations in the national airspace. My staff requested that memo from you, and my understanding is your team declined to provide it. That is also unacceptable. I want to ask you at this hearing, will you commit to providing that memo to this committee?
Matthew Braman:
Senator, I’ll commit to reviewing the information and getting what we can to you absolutely.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):
That answer needs to be a yes, that you will provide that memo to this committee.
Matthew Braman:
Senator, I will review that and we’ll look at the ability to give it to the committee, absolutely.
1:19:50 Matthew Braman:
Army policy is ADS-B Out is not to be used for routine use.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Okay, so Acting Administrator, did you know this? Did the FAA know this? Did the FAA know and understand and absorb this? Did you know that you were letting a flight to go within 75 feet of each other, and there was no signaling message that we have already identified as a safety measure, is something that we have had as a requirement?
Chris Rocheleau:
So I understand the FAA was aware of this. We have an existing memorandum of agreement with —
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Did you know was 100%, as Eleanor Holmes Norton and as the Brigadier General was pretty clear this morning, we don’t allow it. Even to the point of not answering Senator Cruz when they’re going to change it, because I’m pretty sure their attitude is going to be, we don’t allow it. He’s going to say he would rather have a route somewhere where he can fly without it. That’s what he’s going to say. And so, you know, that’s a separate issue over here. Our job, though, is the FAA oversight. And you can’t give exemptions to things that you don’t understand. And so he, in their application, kind of made it sound like, well, it’s not going to be that routine, but he’s very clear, they’re never turning it on if they don’t have to, they’re never turning it on. So what I don’t understand is why the FAA didn’t understand that. Why you would allow this design? This is the wrong design. Whoever said you could fly in this airspace, this close together, without a safety feature that was already being required by the FAA, and then giving them an exemption makes no sense. So why did you allow it to happen?
Chris Rocheleau:
I can’t speak to why the previous administration may have allowed for that memorandum of agreement, which is why we, effective today, will require in any DCA Class B airspace ADS-B Out, to be turned on, except in very limited circumstances.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
What are those other limited circumstances? Is there any other agency that’s doing this?
Chris Rocheleau:
So we have 46 different helicopter operators within the National Capital Region, but again DCA Class B airspace will now require ADS-B Out to be on.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
What other agencies are operating this way?
Chris Rocheleau:
So we have, certainly a number of military units. We have local law enforcement. We certainly have the Department of Justice and FBI. We have a number of different agencies that fly — the National Park Police — and those are the entities that we’re working with closely now to make sure, first and foremost, they understand the new restrictions that we have in the airspace. They have exemptions. Some of them do.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Are you concerned about this?
Chris Rocheleau:
Absolutely, which is why we immediately put in place the requirement to have ADS-B Out on.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
So you think they’re operating that way?
Chris Rocheleau:
Yes, ma’am.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
You think that Homeland Security is operating that way?
Chris Rocheleau:
They are operating — Effective today, they will be operating with ADS-B
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Effective today?
Chris Rocheleau:
Yes, ma’am.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
So for the last month, you’ve known, as I am going to submit for the record a letter from the Department of Homeland Security that basically says, under the Federal Aviation waiver, all US Custom and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations in the Capital region basically have this exemption as well.
Chris Rocheleau:
So they haven’t had —
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
So I want to understand if people were still flying in this airspace, we all fly in and out of this airspace, do we now have to worry about other operators in this airspace that may be doing the same thing as happened with the military? So now you’re telling me you’re going to take action today.
Chris Rocheleau:
I should clarify. Immediately after the accident, we put the restrictions in place so that no mixed traffic could occur, no helicopters and fixed wing in the same air space. Today, we’re requiring the ADS-B Out to be on .So previous to this day, the fixed wing as well as helicopters, were not allowed in the airspace. So we cleared. We cleared the complexity —
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Now today you’re going to say to Homeland Security, you have to have ADB-S on, basically the automatic surveillance broadcast system has to be on. You’re going to make that today.
Chris Rocheleau:
That’s correct, for any of the class B airspace that you can see in the graphic, in that red airspace.
1:26:10 Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
Before recognizing Senator Budd, let me ask Mr. Rocheleau, does the FAA have the authority to supersede the operations of the army and these other agencies in the airspace around airports? We haven’t gotten the army to say they’re going to do this with their own policy, but you say you’re mandating it. Do we know that the army and others have to follow your mandate?
Chris Rocheleau:
Yes, sir, they do.
1:27:15 Sen. Ted Budd (R-NC):
On page nine of the preliminary report, it states that the MPFR, the multi purpose flight recorders, reading for pressure altitude conflicted with other altitude readings. Ultimately, this conflict led your team to invalidate the pressure altitude reading provided by the recorder. Can you provide any details on the differing altitude readings, and do you have any update on whether this conflicting data was limited to the MPFR, or if that was provided to the flight crew, and perhaps was a confusing factor?
Jennifer Homendy:
We are still looking into that and doing some testing. What I will say is the pressure altitude was determined invalid on the Black Hawk, because we would expect that to be somewhat similar to the CRJ, but it was much lower, so we determined that that was invalid and couldn’t be used to calculate the barometric altitude. We would need two sets of data, which is pressure altitude and barometric pressure setting. We had the pressure setting. We don’t have the pressure altitude data for that, so we were not able to determine from that what the barometric altitude was of the Black Hawk. However, we are looking at other data.
1:29:35 Sen. Ted Budd (R-NC):
Can the army continue to fulfill its priority air transport missions without access to Route 1 and Route 4?
Matthew Braman:
The army is certainly, the fact that we’re in the working groups will allow us to help influence routing. That will allow us to continue to do that mission. I’m confident we can do that.
1:30:15 Sen. Ted Budd (R-NC):
Administrator Rocheleau, the aviation investigation report from the NTSB shows that the separation between an aircraft on Approach Runway 3 would have a mere 75 feet of separation from a helicopter operating on Route 4 and hugging the shoreline of the east bank of the Potomac. Was the FAA aware of this conflict prior to January 29, and given the insufficient vertical separation that we’re talking about, was the FAA relying solely on controllers in the DCA tower to de-conflict the approach to Runway 3?
Chris Rocheleau:
So the FAA was aware of the design of that airspace in advance of December 29. I would say that’s one of the reasons why we immediately restricted that airspace after the incident to review the circumstances around the airspace.
1:31:10 Chris Rocheleau:
You’re looking at hot spots or mixed traffic areas around the nation, whether that’s Boston, Dallas, LA and Anchorage.
1:34:40 Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
Since the report that we’re discussing here today is two weeks old. What has transpired, if anything, in those two weeks? Have you discovered any new and relevant information that you can share with us?
Jennifer Homendy:
Where would you like me to begin? One thing I can say on ADS-B Out off, that’s policy of the army, butwe are still looking at installation programming and potential for equipment malfunction. And the reason I mentioned this is because for the accident helicopter, no ADSB data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days prior to the accident, and that was abnormal. So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion. The battalion had 25 helicopters, that includes this particular helicopter, nine of them were mic models, and all were transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned on, because we have to verify that it’s working. There were 16 Limas, including the accident helicopter, which we’re still looking at, but seven were transmitting when ADS-B out was turned on. Eight were not and stopped doing so sometime between May and November 2023, we don’t know why. Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified the issue and began working with the army to try to isolate the reason. So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out on, but you also have to make sure that it’s working.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
You indicated working with the army, but there’s other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing it to the army, as if something is necessarily wrong there, o rmore broadly, there’s a problem in receiving the information?
Jennifer Homendy:
For the ADS-B Out on, we wanted to look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion to see whether ADS-B Out when turned on, was actually transmitting data, because we did think it was abnormal that for the helicopter involved in the accident, wasn’t transmitting data for so long.
1:38:05 Jennifer Homendy:
And I think for the public watching, because I think there are a lot of people watching, ADS-B Out broadcasts latitude, longitude,altitude and velocity once per second. It updates once per second, versus four to six seconds for radar, which is significant when you have converging aircraft.
1:40:15 Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL):
You’re not looking at the other operators becuase they’re not part of this accident, correct? Then my question for Mr. Rocheleau is, will the FAA be directing all of the other helicopter operators, whether it’s Homeland Security, local law enforcement, who have this exemption to ADS-B out, will you be directing that they actually test their equipment to make sure that it is actually transmitting the data that can be received?
Chris Rocheleau:
Yes, Senator, I think that’s part of ongoing work in the collaboration between those operators and how we make sure they, first and foremost, understand the requirement and second, that their equipment is functional.
2:08:50 Jennifer Homendy:
We did get a increase in funding that I do want to thank you for to 145 in the CR, it was an anomaly, but for fully staffing the NTSB. Right now we’re at 427. We went down in the last couple of months because people left, we will be able to go up to 450, but fully staffing the NTSB to accomplish our mission would require hiring between 485 and 500 personnel, which requires resources. So as you consider FY 26 it would be helpful.
2:12:20 Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
The fact that ASD-B Out, there’s evidence that the transmissions were not received, and apparently the army doesn’t know that they weren’t received. Why doesn’t the FAA know they’re not received?
Chris Rocheleau:
I’m not aware of that. I know it’s a part of the ongoing investigation. I don’t believe that we receive any helicopter information from the army.
Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS):
But somebody has to be reporting that they were sent but not received. Who do they report that to?
Chris Rocheleau:
Again, I think that’s part of the investigation. My assumption would be the army.
Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL):
The army could have it turned on, but I think what the Chairwoman is saying is that the receiving station got no data, so the army has got it turned on, and they don’t know that it’s not receiving, so this is, again, this communication issue between the different agencies.
2:14:30 Chris Rocheleau:
So in the aftermath, we reduced the rate, the arrival rate, a lot of that was to support the NTSB ongoing investigation and the emergency response work. Today we are running at what we call a 30 rate. So 30 arrivals an hour, and we’re doing that largely in partnership, I mean, we received great information from the NTSB regarding some feedback they were receiving during their preliminary investigation regarding the workload on the controllers themselves. Obviously, the tragic event has an effect. I mean, these people come to work every day, they care about what they do. So we reduced the rate down to 26, slowly we moved back, to now we’re at 30 rate.
2:16:25 Jennifer Homendy:
I would say one area we’re really looking at also is how the army evaluates when there’s reporting of close calls. Do they get those reports the army I’m talking about, and how do they communicate? How, at the battalion level, do they communicate and talk about safety? How do they evaluate safety? Are they getting reports? Are they monitoring their own helicopters that might exceed altitude levels? We have found so far that a lot of the conversation and safety discussion at the battalion level is really focused on OSHA, slips, trips and falls. There is a disconnect on some of the discussion around safety and safety assurance from the Army as a whole versus the battalion level, so we’re really looking at that.
2:38:40 Jennifer Homendy:
The CRJ had ADS-B Out, it did not have ADS-B In, and so we are going to look at what that information could have provided to that flight crew, and how it could have made a difference. We’ve seen that in other investigations, which is why we have these recommendations.
2:35:45 Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
Are you now supportive of ADS-B In as a requirement, making sure that carriers like this regional jet, again, I mentioned earlier, it’s $20,000 or so per plane. Why can’t we just say we’re going to do this?
Chris Rocheleau:
I did understand from the Chair earlier that it’s been an ongoing recommendation. I have not personally looked into that in the last two months as to what the expectations are on ADS-B In. I know that equipment on aircraft, throughout the system, can be challenging, but I certainly will take that back and look into it to figure out what specifically would be required to mandate ADS-B Incertainly, if Congress passes a law, we would, as we did —
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
We already did, by the way, we already did. It was called the reauthorization bill, and as I said in my opening statement, we basically authorized spending for this through the equipage program. And you know, you can discuss how this actually gets deployed, but I’m pretty sure the consumer ends up paying for it regardless, in some way. And so the point is, NTSB has been recommending this. Is that right, Chairwoman?
Jennifer Homendy:
That’s correct.
Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA):
You’ve recommended this since 2008.
Jennifer Homendy:
I have to look, but I think we actually have recommendations on ADS-B In that precedes that. Those were comments. And if I may, may I add our 2008 comments to the hearing record?
Oversight Hearing – National Transportation Safety Board
House Appropriations Committee
March 26, 2025
Witnesses:
- Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
Clips
21:45 Jennifer Homendy: As you know, the NTSB is an independent agency charged with investigating and establishing the facts, circumstances and probable cause of accidents and serious incidents in the US in all modes of transportation. We also serve as the United States accredited representative under international treaty and lead the US response to the investigation of hundreds of accidents that occur overseas annually. The NTSB also delivers a Family Assistance program which focuses on facilitating the recovery and identification of fatally injured passengers involved in the accidents we investigate and communicating with families throughout the course of our investigations. Our current investigative workload includes almost 1250 active investigations in all 50 states, including Puerto Rico, including in many of your districts, in addition to supporting more than 160 foreign investigations in over 50 countries. Throughout a typical year, we work on about 2200 domestic and 450 foreign cases, and we expect the number of cases annually to remain high and continue to increase in complexity.
24:15 Jennifer Homendy: In 2024, we issued 132 new safety recommendations across all modes of transportation, nearly 60% of which have already been implemented voluntarily by the recommendation recipients. This success rate demonstrates the value of our safety recommendations and our work with stakeholders to improve safety. And I think this is an important point that I want to emphasize. The NTSB doesn’t regulate. We don’t want to. The NTSB doesn’t have enforcement authority. We don’t want it. Why? Because our singular focus is on saving lives, and almost all of our safety recommendations we issue are dependent on voluntary action of the recipients. In other words, it’s a true partnership on safety.
29:45 Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK): Let me turn quickly, we’ve obviously had some some incidents in our air travel that are concerning to all of us, and you’ve made several recommendations over the past decade, frankly, regarding Aviation Safety Management System or SMS. While the FAA, I’m told, has implemented requirements for major airlines, we continue to see delays in extending some of these requirements to other aviation sectors, including manufacturers, maintenance facilities, smaller operations. Which of your specific recommendations do you think would be most important to apply across the board to ensure the maximum safety for the flying public?
Jennifer Homendy: Well, for SMS in particular, which you stated, we have recommendations on SMS across all modes of transportation, but in aviation in particular, the focus has been on commercial aviation, and the commercial airlines have had SMS since 2015, but it’s been a very piecemeal approach across the aviation industry. For aviation manufacturers, there was a final rule issued in May of 2024 and that doesn’t go into effect until 2027. So Boeing, for example, is in the early stages of implementing that. But it’s very early stages for other sectors. Part 135, that’s the charter and air taxis, they began the process of SMS at FAA, but that hasn’t been finalized. Maintenance facilities, there’s no requirement for that. Part 91 which are the air tours, also do not have requirements for safety management systems. It should be one level of safety for passengers. That’s what we believe. And the piecemeal approach isn’t working.
35:35 Jennifer Homendy: We have 427 employees, and I will say that we didn’t lose one probationary employee. We got hiring exemptions from the administration. We got an exemption from deferred resignation program. We got tremendous support, and we continue to get support from the administration and as a result of the hard work of our workforce. So we have not experienced any of that, and I’ve maintained our work.
39:15 Jennifer Homendy: Yes, and what we did is we looked at FAA surveillance data and then voluntary reporting system data. So that’s reporting from pilots, reporting from air traffic control. Those are voluntary reporting systems, and then there’s a mandatory reporting system for occurrences in air traffic control. And what the data showed us is that there were 15,214 close proximity events from 2021 through 2024 at DCA, between helicopters and planes.
40:15 Rep. Steve Womack (R-AR): What are the various, and I’ll use the word excuses, but what are the various reasons why many of the things that are recommended by the NTSB never find their way into certain protocols?
Jennifer Homendy: Sometimes they’ll use cost. They’ll say the cost is not justified by the benefits. I will say one thing that we’re looking at as part of this investigation is ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out is required for commercial aircraft, and has been since 2020, but ADS-B In is not required. We’ve been on record since 2008 that ADS-B In should be mandated. But the FAA has used costs as a reason not to mandate that. What that would have done or could have done, and we’ll look at that as part of this investigation, is the CRJ, the plane, had ADS-B Out, it did not have ADS-B In, though American [Airlines] does have some Airbus planes that do have ADS-B In. That could have provided them some information about the helicopter positioning and flight path, but that information was not available to them.
41:50 Jennifer Homendy: I think what is most alarming to me, well, two things. You had reporting over years. In fact, there was reporting going back, there was data going back to 2011 that traffic collision alerts were going off monthly as a result of close proximity to helicopters, and that’s from 2011 through 2024 and so for me, all this data is being collected by FAA, from operators, from others, from voluntary reporting systems. Where is that data going to trend potential accidents and incidents in the future. The next accident is in the data right now, and what are we doing to figure out what that is?
42:35 Jennifer Homendy: The other most alarming to me is how nobody figured out, based on the glide slope going into runway 33, that if you look at the helicopter route, that there’s only 75 feet of separation between a plane coming in to runway 33, max, that’s 75 feet max. That route doesn’t have lateral boundaries. And in fact, in this case, the helicopter was to the right of the route, so it’s a very small margin for error.
57:50 Jennifer Homendy: 15,214 close proximity events. That doesn’t mean that they were near collisions, but close proximity events where the vertical and lateral separation was too small of a margin.
1:29:55 Jennifer Homendy: What I will say, and I know there’s been a lot of focus on aviation, our biggest contributor to fatalities right now in transportation is on our roads. Over 40,000 people are dying on our nation’s roads every year, millions injured. You know, we talk about transportation accidents as single accidents, but every day, an average of 112 people are dying on our roads. 112 people, and we don’t blink an eye. There is so much we have to do to improve road safety across the US, and we have so many recommendations on that. If we can get that number down, that would be significant. That’s 95% of all transportation fatalities.
1:33:00 Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC): Is it true that there was only one at the time?
Jennifer Homendy: No, there were five at the time in the tower. There were nine on duty. What you might be referring to is the combining of positions. There were six at one point during the day before 3:40pm where actually could have been seven, because they combined the position for clearance, delivery and flight data, which is not uncommon, but they did combine positions for the helicopter position and the local traffic position into one. The person didn’t leave. So it went down to five controllers at the time of the accident that. That combined position was at 3:40pm, it stayed that way. The person went on break, came back into rotation at 4:27pm, but in total, there were nine people on duty that day.
Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC): There were nine people in the tower?
Jennifer Homendy: Five in the cab.
Rep. James Clyburn (D-SC): At the time of the accident?
Jennifer Homendy: Correct.
Music
Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito
